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Unlawful Property and Activities as Subjects
of Taxation
Statutes in Ohio make the keeping or exhibiting of a gam-
bling device subject to penalty and property so used may be con-
fiscated and destroyed.' Although slot machines are not gambling
devices per se,2 if they are used improperly they clearly fall within
these statutes and become property of an illegal character.
Acting under the Ohio law which imposes a tax on "all property
located and used in business in the state,"3 the tax commissioner
added the value of certain slot machines to a taxpayer's list of
assessable personal property. In Eflery v. Evatt4 the court sustained
the commissioner over the taxpayer's objection that the machines
were mere gambling devices, not subjects of ownership as defined
by statute." This appears to be the first decision in Ohio treating
the validity of a tax imposed upon chattels of an illegal nature.
The absence of similar cases in other jurisdictions indicates either
that such property is not taxed or that the owners choose not to
litigate the matter.
It is the form of the tax rather than the nature of the property
subjected thereto which presents the novelty, for under the
Revenue Act of 1918, which laid a federal tax on certain enumerated
sporting goods and other "games and parts of games," slot machines
were held taxable.6
The validity of classifying slot machines as games may well
be questioned, 7 but the case illustrates that gambling devices, as
such, are not immune to taxation.
In the two preceding cases ithe legislative intent to tax the
particular article was an issue, but once this was decided the court
had no trouble in sustaining the tax although it fell on the sale and
manufacture of objects tainted with illegality.
It is not unusual to find occupation or license taxes levied
I Onro GEN. CODE §§ 13066 and 13430-8.
2 In re Estate of Weisenberg, 147 Ohio St. 152, 70 N.E. 2d 269 (1946).
3 OHo Gl€. CODE § 5325.
4 140 Ohio St. 249, 42 N.E. 2d. 979 (1942).
r The statute, Ohio Gen. Code § 5325, defines personal property as "every
tangible thing being the subject of ownership" (with certain exceptions not
pertinent here).
6 Mills Novelty Co. v. United States, 50 F. 2d 476 (Ct. CL 1931).
7 See Feitler v. Harrison, 126 F. 2d 449 (7th Cir. 1942) (where under a sim-
ilar act punchboards held not taxable since no contest was involved).
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upon businesses or activities that are in violation of the law; for
example: a license tax on punchboards was upheld in Alabama,
although the display of the boards was illegal 8 The usual argument
of the taxpayer in such cases is that the tax necessarily amounts
to a grant of authority inconsistent with the prohibition. The United
States Supreme Court rejected this argument very early in the
License Tax Cases,9 and the state courts have generally followed
the high court whether the taxpayer is objecting to the payment of
the tax,10 or attempting to use payment as a defense to prosecution
under the prohibiting.statute."
The contention that a taxing unit has no authority to tax that
which. is forbidden has been frequently raised in cases involving
state and federal liquor taxes with little success. Ohio liquor taxes
have been sustained even though levied upon traffic forbidden by
local ordinance12 or the state constitution.13 During the federal
prohibition era the federal courts were in conflict as to the con-
gressional intent,14 but there was general agreement that Congress
still had the power to tax liquors. Similarly the income derived
from illicit liquor traffic was held subject to federal income taxes.'r
There is some support, however, for the theory that a thing
unlawful in itself cannot be subject to any taxation; thus it. was
decided in Texas that the state could not levy an occupational tax
9n the business of selling liquor in a county in which such an
occupation was forbidden by. local option.16 Likewise, in a recent
Kentucky decision a proposed municipal ordinance to levy an
occupation tax on slot machine and handbook operation was found
to be illegal because statutes outlawed such occupations."?
Ij a recent Ohio case,1 8 again involving a property tax on
slot machines, the taxpayer proposed an interesting theory. He
8 Casmus v. Lee, 236 Ala. 396, 183 So. 185 (1935); see 118 ALR 822 (1939)
(Taxing Unlawful Activities).
9 72 U. S. 462 (1866) (federal license taxes on unlicensed dealings in
lottery tickets and liquors upheld).
10 Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Miich. 406, 20 Am. Rep. 654 (1875); Brannan
v. Schartzer, 4 Ohio App. 356, 35 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 626 (1915).
11 Palmer v. State, 88 Tenn. 553, 13 S.W. 233 (1890); State v. Caldwell,
3 La. Ann. 435 (1848).; for general discussion see 110 A.L.R. 827 (1937).
12 Conwell v. Sears, 65 Ohio St. 49, 61 N.E. 155 (1901).
13 Kenich v. McClearly, 103 Ohio St. 457, 134 N.E. 462 (1921).
.14 Compare: Kelchun v. United States, 270 Fed. 416 (8th Cir. 1921) with
Silken v. United States, 293 Fed. 923 (8th Cir. 1923).
15 United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S. 450 (1920); United States v. One
Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321 (1926).
16 State v. Texas Brewing Co., 106 Tex. 121, 157 S.W. 1166 (1913).
17 Beierle v. City of Newport, 305 Ky. 477, 204 S.W. 2d 806 (1947).
18 Capitol Novelty Co. v. Evatt, 145 Ohio St. 205, 61 NXE. 2d 211 (1945),
cert. denied 326 U. S. 738 (1945).
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complained that his interest or ownership in the machines in Ohio
was without benefit, and to compel him to pay taxes without in
turn granting him benefits similar to those granted like taxpayers
was a denial of the rights guaranteed by both state (Art. 1 Sec. 2)
and federal (IV Amendment) constitutions. This "benefits" argu-
ment is by no means unique in the field of taxation but was- given
an unusual application in this case. The Ohio court followed a long
line of federal cases'9 and flatly rejected the contention. It is not
uncommon in the field of taxation to impose a tax upon a class or
upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expendi-
tures.20 Indeed if each tax had to be apportioned to the direct
benefits received few taxes could be sustained. The familiar argu-
ment that taxation and protection are reciprocal was raised in an
early Ohio case and rejected.2 1
The taxpayer's contention in Ellery v. Evatt that the- slot
machines were mere gambling devices and so not subjects of owner-
ship as defined by the statute raises an interesting question. Lower
courts in Ohio have found that no property right exists in gambling
devices.22 Courts of other jurisdictions have held that such devices
cannot be replevied by a former possessor if used solely for gambling
purposes,23 but can be replevied if they are capable of any legitimate
use.24 To make such a distinction is to recognize a property right
in the gambling device measured by its capacity for legal use.
In some jurisdictions where by statute gambling devices may
be seized and destroyed, the constitutionality of such statute is
based on the theory that gambling devices are dangerous to public
welfare and are not property within the meaning of the due process
clause. One would not expect to find a property tax on a slot
machine in a jurisdiction where this concept obtains.
Under the Ohio statutes it is not an offense to possess a gam-
bling device unless it is kept or exhibited for gain, and the express
authorization to destroy the device is dependent upon conviction
for illegal possession. It is difficult logically to maintain that prop-
erty, which has been rendered contraband and subject to im-
mediate seizure by the illegal use to which it has been put, can, at
the same time, be owned by anyone. It would seem valid, rather, to
contend that the legal ownership of a gambling device is forfeited
19 Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1936); Carley
v. Hamilton and Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1897).20 For example: 115 Ohio Laws 26 (1933) (gasoline taxes used for
unemployment relief); OHIo GEN. CODE § 6212-491 (beer taxes used for un-
employment relief).
21 Stevenson v. Hunter, 2 Ohio N. 300 (1892).
22 Akron v. Stoganovic, 24 Ohio NY'. (ns) 479 (1923).
23 Mullen v. Moseley, 13 Idaho 457, 90 Pac. 986 (1907).
24 Wagner v. Upshur, 95 Md. 519, 52 Atl. 509 (1902).
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the moment it is put to the use which the statute prohibits, because
such machines can be confiscated immediately upon their being
so used. Indeed, one lower court in Ohio permitted destruction of
a machine irrespective of its present use, on the ground that it was
possible to transform it into a gambling device by removing a
part 25 If it be true that one's property in a device ceases upon its
being improperly employed, the property in the slot machines,
which were the subject of controversy in Ellery v. Evatt, had fled,
the use of the machines in that case being admittedly entirely for
gambling purposes. The court, however, found that the "subject of
ownership" portion of the defining statute was satisfied by the
taxpayer's having purchased and paid for the machines and having
maintained and put them to use for gain.
It is possible that the imposition of a tax on property, ownership
of which has been forfeited by reason of the illegal use thereof,
results from a failure properly to distinguish between taxation
of the-illegal occupation, and taxation of the property used in such
illegal occupation. With respect to the tax on the property, to state
the proposition is to illustrate the apparent fallacy; a property tax on
chattels of an illegal nature compels one to pay a duty, based on
ownership, on property which is legally incapable of being owned.
This objection is not present with respect to taxes levied on
occupations or uses.
In the final analysis, however, whether that which is unlawful
shall or shall not be taxed rests upon a policy basis. The argument
against such a tax is that the attraction of the additional revenue
derived therefrom tends toward a laxity of law enforcement, at
least on local levels.26 The support of the opposite view lies in the
theory that taxing the unlawful is a deterrent to the crime, which
supplements rather than discourages enforcement of criminal
statutes. It is well known that merely prohibiting an activity
seldom causes it to cease altogether, and the policy of continu-
ing a tax cannot be regarded as unsound, since to allow the
argument to prevail that a tax is a license would tend to en-
courage participation. Nor should the tax be withheld because
no benefit is derived when it is the taxpayer who deprived him-
self of those benefits. Thus it appears that whether an individual
is using his property in a manner forbidder by law, or engaging in
an illicit business he continues to be subject to taxes of all forms.
C. Stanley Taylor and Joseph S. Wise
25 Steed v. Tate, Sheriff, No. 331, Greene County, Ohio, May 1930, cited
in Miller v. Warren, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 443 (1935).
20 Beierle v. City of Newport, 305 Ky. 477, 204 S.W. 2d 806 (1947). (The
court condemning a local occupation tax on gambling. "Where a city's
treasury is found, there may its heart be found also.")
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